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Unvested: How Equity and the Deferred
Payment Gamble in Startups
Shortchange Employees Targeted by
Discrimination
KATIE BLACK*
The new American Dream is not limited to Silicon Valley. Startups span the nation. They exist in a vast array of
sizes and ideologies. Nonetheless, by their very nature,
startups are boundary-pushing enterprises. For all the
world-altering good they can do, sometimes, that crashinginto-walls mentality comes at the price of pushing human
and legal boundaries as well. While the entity tries to grow
and create, almost hydraulically using what little human and
financial capital it may have to build the once-impossible,
startup employees can be left to bear the cost when it is their
boundaries that are broken. Discrimination is one such cost.
Current federal and state antidiscrimination law frameworks reflect a legal landscape perilously out of sync with
the reality that startups are now entirely commonplace.
While startups may sometimes literally be small businesses,
they can have far outsized economic and human effects. This
Note will analyze how current antidiscrimination law frameworks too often inherently fail employees suffering discrimination at smaller startups—irrespective of that startup’s
*

J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2015, University of Miami; software engineer; startup has-been. This Note could not have
been written to completion without the encouragement and help of David
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Shara Pelz for their incredible support and guidance throughout the process of
writing this Note. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their unending reassurance and patience.
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age, purpose, or capitalization. Further, this Note will address the necessity of reforming Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws to catch them up with the speed at which
startups have brushed them aside. In short, ready or not, the
law must adapt.
The phrase, “done is better than perfect,” has long become a somewhat dogmatic maxim taught to most programmers—myself included. This ideology holds some merit
when it comes to productivity sprints, hackathons, and getting a product to market. However, the danger of this credo
arises when it is applied to people and the relationships
among them—when the uncompromising push to “done,”
and the culture it entails, comes at the expense of those who
get it there.
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INTRODUCTION
“We have a saying: ‘Move fast and break things.’ The idea is
that if you never break anything, you’re probably not moving fast
enough.”1 This creed, articulated over a decade ago2 by Mark Zuckerberg, may no longer be Facebook’s rallying cry,3 but the sentiment
has long since left an indelible scar.
Breaking things is not necessarily bad. Often, we need a good
shake-up to draw us from our reverie and propel us forward in the
spirit of innovation and inspiration. Such a jolt is sometimes one of
the only forces that can jar loose new ideas and businesses that will,
as phrased in the iconic 1997 Apple commercial, “push the human
race forward.”4 Whether society believes them to be fools or heroes—or potentially even villains—entrepreneurs and the businesses they build are unquestionably critical to the economy.5
Startup companies, in particular, are known for their innovative and
disruptive impact on the economy—perfectly adaptable to established tech centers or war-torn nations, and workable whether bootstrapped from nothing or well-funded by venture capitalists.6
The innovation of entrepreneurship itself is relatively incalculable by most normal economic standards, which preserve quantifiable ideals such as “perfect information” and “perfect competition.”7
This is because entrepreneurship requires corresponding inventive
1

Mark Zuckerberg’s Letter to Investors: ‘The Hacker Way’, WIRED (Feb. 1,
2012, 6:35 PM), https://wired.com/2012/02/zuck-letter/.
2
See Henry Blodget, Mark Zuckerberg on Innovation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct.
1, 2009, 4:36 PM), https://businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-innovation2009-10.
3
See Nick Statt, Zuckerberg: ‘Move fast and break things’ isn’t how Facebook operates anymore, CNET (Apr. 30, 2014, 10:30 AM), https://cnet.com/
news/zuckerberg-move-fast-and-break-things-isnt-how-we-operate-anymore/.
4
Apple,
The
Crazy
Ones,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
16,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmqH1cWIMVY (uploaded by HistoryvsHollywood titled “Apple Steve Jobs The Crazy Ones Commercial – 1997”).
5
STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1–2 (13th ed. 2013).
6
See Ahmad Fahim Didar, Role of Startups in Economic Prosperity,
STARTUP GRIND,
https://startupgrind.com/blog/role-of-startups-in-economicprosperity/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
7
David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
283, 288–89 (2008).
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ways of creating change, building markets, and bringing people together to ensure the success of a venture in an environment built on
the tantalizing uncertainty of solving seemingly unconquerable
problems.8 That is to say, nothing about building an entrepreneurial
venture is “perfect”—the unquantifiable nature of the impossible is
part of the fun. However difficult to fathom, the sheer socioeconomic importance of entrepreneurship and its culture of innovation
leads to a societal reimagining of laws and legal relationships to help
these new inventions come to life.9
In this reimagining of laws, practices, and relationships, “new”
sometimes means neither better, nor worse. Often this interpretation
depends on the vantage point and data that factors into the analysis.
For instance, Airbnb’s website displays an entire analysis of its economic impact on the communities in which it operates—touting,
among other things, that fifty-three percent of its hosts, of which
fifty-two percent reported being low-income, indicated that the revenue they earned from Airbnb enabled them to stay in their homes.10
For Airbnb and stakeholders who view Airbnb’s mission as aligned
with theirs, this reimagining of the status quo within the hotel and
travel industries impacts communities for the better by providing
homeowners with a new revenue stream.11 Yet, there are genuine
pitfalls to this reimagining for those very same homeowners—such
as the negative effects of short-term rentals on long-term housing
8

See id. at 290–91 (discussing advancing theories by economists like Joseph
Schumpeter on entrepreneurship as “developing the idea of the entrepreneur as
innovator, forcing major structural changes across markets and industries in a process of ‘creative destruction’ vital for sustaining a dynamic economy and longrun economic growth.”); see ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP 27 (2011) (defining
a startup as “a human institution designed to create a new product or service under
conditions of extreme uncertainty” and noting that this definition “says nothing
about the size of the company, the industry, or the sector of the economy.”); see
also id. at 22 (“Startups also have a true north, a destination in mind: creating a
thriving and world-changing business.”).
9
Steven H. Hobbs, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the
Creative Impulse, 4 ENTREPRENEURSHIP BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2009).
10
The Economic Impacts of Home Sharing in Cities Around the World,
AIRBNB [hereinafter Airbnb Impacts], https://airbnb.com/economic-impact
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191214143743/https://www.airbnb.ca/economic-impact?locale=en] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
11
See id.
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availability, decreasing the supply and increasing the costs of longterm housing.12
In other cases, however, rapid and unchecked creative destruction13 of laws and norms can be unquestionably harmful—if not altogether dangerous—to society in general and, frequently, to startup employees. Take, for example, the case study of gaming company Zynga’s initial public offering (“IPO”), wherein management,
wanting to regain some of the stock options promised to employees,
clawed back already-allocated, albeit not entirely-vested,14 grants of
equity.15 Despite its legality under at-will employment and contract

12
JOSH BIVENS, THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIRBNB: NO
REASON FOR LOCAL POLICYMAKERS TO LET AIRBNB BYPASS TAX OR
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS 4, https://www.epi.org/publication/the-economiccosts-and-benefits-of-airbnb-no-reason-for-local-policymakers-to-let-airbnb-bypass-tax-or-regulatory-obligations/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2019) (“The single biggest potential cost imposed by Airbnb comes in the form of higher housing costs
for city residents if enough properties are converted from long-term housing to
short-term accommodations.”).
13
Vijay Raju, Creative destruction or destructive creation?, WORLD ECON.
F. (May 5, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/creative-destruction-or-destructive-creation/ (describing economist Joseph Schumpeter’s invention of phrase “‘creative destruction’” as “the premise in which new innovations
destroy established enterprises and create new markets.”); see Sharon Reier, Half
a Century Later, Economist’s ‘Creative Destruction’ Theory is Apt for the Internet Age: Schumpeter: The Prophet of Bust and Boom, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2000),
https://nytimes.com/2000/06/10/your-money/IHT-half-a-century-latereconomists-creative-destruction-theory-is.html (describing applicability and actualization of Schumpeter’s theory to current age of startups, including that
“Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur as the cornerstone of capitalism.”).
14
See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“Stock options typically are
‘granted’ (given) to the worker but cannot be exercised right away. Instead, they
‘vest’ (become exercisable) over time or upon the achievement of certain goals.”);
see James Linfield, Founder Basics: Founder’s Stock, Vesting and Founder Departures, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/founder-basics-foundersstock/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing vesting in that “[u]nder a typical
vesting schedule, the stock vests in monthly or quarterly increments over four
years,” including that “[t]here is often a one year ‘cliff’, meaning that the individual must be with the company for a year to vest the first increment.”).
15
Justin Scheck & Shayndi Raice, Zynga Leans on Some Workers to Surrender Pre-IPO Shares, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577018373223480802.
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doctrines,16 this bad-faith practice “erode[s] a central pillar of Silicon Valley culture, in which start-ups with limited cash and a risk
of failure dangle the possibility of stock riches in order to lure talent.”17 An even more jarring example of dangerous creative destruction has been Facebook’s decision to hire third-party moderators to
screen videos and other posts for content that violate its community
standards.18 This practice exposed many of these moderators to
posts containing, among other things, murder, other heinous crimes,
and radicalizing extremism, which caused many moderators to suffer symptoms identical to post-traumatic stress disorder19 or the
even more pervasive20 reality of rampant discrimination, which is of
particular concern in this Note.
As Eric Ries describes in his bestselling book, The Lean Startup,
Entrepreneurs are rightly wary of implementing traditional management practices early on in a startup,
afraid that they will invite bureaucracy or stifle
16

Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of
Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 580 (2013).
17
Scheck & Raice, supra note 15.
18
See Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Moderators in America, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-traumaworking-conditions-arizona; see Scott Simon & Emma Bowman, Propaganda,
Hate Speech, Violence: The Working Lives of Facebook’s Content Moderators,
NPR (Mar. 2, 2019, 8:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/02/699663284/theworking-lives-of-facebooks-content-moderators.
19
Newton, supra note 18; see Simon & Bowman, supra note 18.
20
Ina Fried, Silicon Valley’s Quieter Discrimination Fight, AXIOS (May 29,
2018),
https://www.axios.com/ageism-tech-industry-silicon-valley-intel00be0045-c52a-4485-a64b-0c6238fee40c.html (describing an EEOC investigation into Intel as a proxy for “Silicon Valley [having] a love affair with young
founders.”); Lydia Dishman, 60% of Women in Silicon Valley Have Been Sexually
Harassed, FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/
3055395/60-of-women-in-silicon-valley-have-been-sexually-harassed (describing statistics on and specific incidences of sexual harassment in Silicon Valley);
see Jordyn Holman, Silicon Valley is Using Trade Secrets to Hide Its Race Problem, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/silicon-valley-is-using-trade-secrets-to-hide-its-race-problem (last updated Feb. 15,
2019, 2:58 AM) (analyzing how companies hide required reporting on hiring of
people of color and women and avoid providing statistics to EEOC, which would
likely show a lack of diversity in their workforce).
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creativity. . . . As a result, many entrepreneurs take a
“just do it” attitude, avoiding all forms of management, process, and discipline. Unfortunately, this approach leads to chaos more often than it does to success.21
Startups eschewing traditional roles like human resources or
management oversight22 culminates time and again in rampant discrimination on the basis of race,23 age,24 and sex.25 This does not
mean that startups inherently intend to engage in discrimination, but
instead, it is a repeated consequence of a general lack of care for
traditional business and legal norms that exist for a reason. These
traditional norms are guided by protections that have long been codified in federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).26
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), the agency that enforces these laws, has stated that no
agreement—not even a severance agreement containing a waiver or
release of all claims—can preclude an employee from seeking protection from discrimination under federal antidiscrimination laws.27
21

RIES, supra note 8, at 15.
Julianne Teveten, HR Comes Last at Startups and Women Pay the Price,
VICE (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://vice.com/en_us/article/z43wdx/hr-comeslast-at-startups-and-women-pay-the-price (describing how employees at a company felt that HR issues caused employees to take themselves “too seriously,” and
how rapid and uneven growth that is characteristic of startups often leaves employees without organization, which can “[blur] the boundaries between professional life and social life.”); Cale Guthrie Weissman, The Future of HR and Why
Startups Shouldn’t Reject It, FASTCOMPANY (May 10, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059673/the-future-of-hr-and-why-startups-shouldnt-reject-it
(commenting on startups’ belief that “‘HR is dead’” and decline in belief in startup
circles that HR is required).
23
See Holman, supra note 20.
24
See Fried, supra note 20.
25
See Dishman, supra note 20.
26
See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
27
Q&A-Understanding Waivers of Discrimination Claims in Employee Severance Agreements, EEOC (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
qanda_severance-agreements.html.
22
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But these laws apply only under specific circumstances. Title VII,
for instance, applies only if a company has over fifteen people, and
the ADEA only applies if there are over twenty.28 While some states
have passed separate and stronger antidiscrimination protections for
workers,29 the scope of federal antidiscrimination protection is not
ubiquitous.
While this leaves several issues to explore, this Note will primarily analyze the following: closing the gap in federal antidiscrimination law and the way startups are uniquely reshaping the traditional legal landscape, specifically within employment law. Moreover, this Note will explore the impact on employee compensation,
namely equity, when employees are forced to resign due to discrimination in companies that are not under the purview of federal antidiscrimination law. This Note places specific focus on discrimination and recovery recourse under Title VII, as well as what legal
recourse startup employees can seek outside of its protections. But,
to understand the full effect of this inquiry, it is necessary to first
understand the elements of startup culture that are vulnerable to violations of federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VII. Part I provides a brief primer on the uniqueness of both working in and being
paid by a startup. Subsequently, Part II discusses the backdrop
against which discrimination occurs in more detail, along with its
contemporaneous and future relevancy to the legal community. Part
III will then analyze federal antidiscrimination law in detail and illustrate how employees can seek recovery when protected under
these laws in accordance with the agreements and payment structure
outlined in Part I. Further, Part IV will provide an inquiry into what
can be done in the absence of codified recourse: that is, when federal
antidiscrimination laws do not apply and employees encounter far
more difficulty attempting to state a claim. Finally, the Conclusion
will provide suggestions as to how to solve these emerging problems
within employment law.

28

Small Business Requirements, EEOC [hereinafter EEOC Small Business
Requirements],
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/requirements
.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
29
Id.
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A wall at Facebook’s headquarters used to be painted with the
phrase “[d]one is better than perfect.”30 It has long become a somewhat dogmatic maxim taught to most programmers—myself included. This ideology holds some merit when it comes to productivity sprints, hackathons, and getting a product to market. However,
the danger of this ideology arises when it is applied to people and
the relationships among them—when the dogmatic push to “done,”
and the culture it entails, comes at the expense of those who get it
there.
That being said, however, purely describing startup culture in
this Note will only ever be so effective. To better tell this startup
story, I want to introduce a narrative element in the form of a hypothetical. With everything that has so far been described in mind, imagine for a moment that Alex is a software engineer at a small startup
of eleven people. Alex is twenty-two and has worked for the startup
for ten months. Over the past several months, Alex has been stalked
and otherwise harassed by a coworker, including repeated incidents
at work, and no longer feels safe working at the company. Although
Alex’s employer was informed, nothing has substantially changed,
and Alex feels there is no other recourse but to resign in the interest
of safety.
I.

THE BACKGROUND: A DAY-IN-THE-LIFE OF GETTING PAID
BY AND WORKING IN A STARTUP

A.
Equity and the Pervasive Deferred Payment Gamble
Funding innovation is expensive. With cash at a premium,
startups often look to equity compensation31 to conserve liquidity
30

Martin Lindstrom, The Truth About Being “Done” Versus Being “Perfect”, FASTCOMPANY (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com
/3001533/truth-about-being-done-versus-being-perfect.
31
See Erik Lie & Tingting Que, On the Use of Option Grants as a Retention
Tool 1, 4 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3504794 (“[T]he inclination to use options is more prominent among firms with employees who are at high risk of
transferring proprietary intellectual capital.”); Erik Lie & Tingting Que, On the
Use of Option Grants as a Retention Tool, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/01/16/on-the-use-of-
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while still attracting talent.32 Offering equity in the company in lieu
of cash, or the opportunity to purchase equity in the future in lieu of
cash in the present, are, therefore, commonly-used tools in startup
employment contracts.33 Although there is no “one-size-fits-all”
model34 for how startups compensate their employees with equity,35
pervasive in startup ideology is the belief that they should attract and
hire those employees who want equity compensation36 because such
employees will “sacrifice the higher cash salary and security of more
established companies.”37
option-grants-as-a-retention-tool/; Amelia Friedman, 7 Compensation Strategies
for Cash-Strapped Startups, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 12, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/7-compensation-strategies-for-cash-strapped-startups.
32
Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death – The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265,
274 (2006); see REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“New ventures need to be
creative in recruitment strategies in order to attract and retain top talent while reserving as much cash as possible to build and grow the business.”); Meghan Casserly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every Startup’s Secret Weapon, FORBES
(Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/
2013/03/08/understanding-employee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw/ (commenting on an
interview at SXSW with former CEO of PayPal, Bill Harris, that stock options are
“every early stage startup’s very best friend” in that they require no cash expenditure).
33
See Booth, supra note 32, at 273.
34
David S. Rose, How Much Equity Should You Offer Your Startup’s Team
Members?, GUST LAUNCH (Aug. 31, 2018), https://gust.com/launch/blog/howmuch-equity-should-you-offer-your-startup-team-members (“Because each
startup is different, and each person joins a different situation, there are no onesize-fits-all rules.”).
35
Professor Booth explains as follows:
[E]quity compensation may take several different forms, ranging from outright grants of stock to grants of stock options at
the current market price. . . . Or [the company] might pay the
employee with an option whose strike price is equal to the market price (or value) of the stock on the date of the grant. . . . Or
it may grant stock that vests only after some delay. . . .
Booth, supra note 32, at 271.
36
Casserly, supra note 32 (“‘The people you want to attract to your business
are the people who want equity,’ [Bill Harris, former CEO of PayPal,] says. ‘You
need people who are willing to take risks.’”).
37
Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1737, 1750 (1994); see Smith, supra note 16, at 607 (“Startups compensate
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Despite the lack of a one-size-fits-all method for giving out equity, it commonly fits two general forms, either “outright grants of
stock” or “grants of stock options at the current market price.”38 This
equity, however granted, has value upon transference to the employee.39 For an outright grant, the value of the equity is measured
by its market value at the time of issuance.40 For an option, which
provides the employee with the ability to purchase equity in the
company at a later time, its inherent value is relative to the time of
purchase by or transference to the employee.41 Stock options manifest as the ability to purchase shares of the company at a later date
for its current price; this means that, if the value of the shares increase, employees can purchase higher market-valued shares at a
lower price.42 The most common of these forms is the stock option
grant.43 It is important to note that, for startups, giving equity is more
than just a method of supplementary payment; it is, perhaps most
importantly, an effective litmus test to attract and hire employees
who are interested in investing themselves in the company and in
advancing the startup’s vision and core values.44 In short, equity
payments are symbolic of the glue that holds a startup together. As
Eric Ries states in The Lean Startup, “We often lose sight of the fact
that a startup is not just about a product, a technological
employees by combining lower salaries than they could get at more established
companies with substantial stock option grants. These stock options must be valuable to employees because they accept them as reasons to turn down larger cash
offers.”); REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“[O]ffering equity compensation
is an attractive way of supplementing leaner salaries.”).
38
Booth, supra note 32, at 271.
39
Id.
40
See id.
41
See id. at 271–72.
42
REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228; see Booth, supra note 32, at 272
(“The value of a stock option depends on the value of the underlying equity.”);
see Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973) (“In general, it seems clear that the
higher the price of the stock, the greater the value of the option.”).
43
See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228.
44
Kyrstal Barghelame, Here’s How Startup Founders Should Offer Employee Equity, GUSTO (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.gusto.com/blog/hiring/startup-founders-employee-equity (“The stock options you offer to employees
aren’t just a bunch of percentages and numbers; They’re a reflection of your company’s values and philosophies.”).
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breakthrough, or even a brilliant idea. A startup is greater than the
sum of its parts; it is an acutely human enterprise.”45
This cash sacrifice for equity inherently creates a deferred payoff gamble—often literally referred to as a “lottery ticket.”46 One of
the reasons that entrepreneurship is so economically incalculable or
inestimable47 is because its fundamental principles, such as the decision to invest in this lottery ticket-equity gamble, are entirely contrary to the common economic ideology that people are risk averse
at their core.48 Nevertheless, startups and the entrepreneurs that create them thrive on the edge of uncertainty in the throes of creative
destruction and innovation.49 It comes as no surprise, then, that in
keeping with this culture of uncertainty, entrepreneurs hire entrepreneurs—those willing to take the lottery ticket gamble along with the
founders.50
Equity compensation is a commitment to the “long-term view”
of the company.51 It is considered a lottery ticket because it may or
may not pay off in the long-term. Employees must make, as Professor Thomas Smith of the University of San Diego Law School estimates, an “entrepreneurial judgment” that their labor and personal
investment in the company has a chance (even if remote) that the
payoff will be worth the investment.52 Smith also notes that this investment creates an opportunity cost of “the difference between the
45

RIES, supra note 8, at 28.
Smith, supra note 16, at 607; see Casserly, supra note 32.
47
Pozen, supra note 7, at 288–89.
48
Smith, supra note 16, at 607–08; Ted O’Donoghue & Jason Somerville,
Modeling Risk Aversion in Economics, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (2018).
49
See Smith, supra note 16, at 600; see also RIES, supra note 8, at ix.
50
See Smith, supra note 16, at 609–11; see also Martin Zwilling, A Growing
Startup Should Only Hire Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2011, 11:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2011/02/23/a-growing-startupshould-only-hire-entrepreneurs/ (“This commitment to hire people who think like
entrepreneurs, or install an ‘owners mindset’ in every employee, should be a high
priority in every business.”).
51
Booth, supra note 32, at 276–77; see Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 4. “Stock
option grants might serve to reduce turnovers . . . . [T]hey are effectively deferred
payments, such that employees who leave might forego substantial value, either
because they exercise the options early thereby giving up time value, or forfeit
unvested options, thereby giving up their entire value.” Id. at 1.
52
Smith, supra note 16, at 609–11.
46
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present value of [an employee’s] total compensation at the startup
and the present value of whatever [their] total compensation would
have been at [their] best available alternative.”53 Moreover, Smith
describes this “willingness of a startup employee to accept stock options in lieu of greater cash compensation” as “send[ing] a powerful
signal to the employer that the prospective employee shares the
founders’ entrepreneurial perception regarding the startup’s significant opportunity for success, and that the candidate is willing to join
[their] economic fate to that of the new company.”54 Importantly,
this gambit aligns employees’ goals with those of the founders and
the enterprise as a whole55: The very compensation structure itself
demands that employees take risks and dedicate themselves to the
company’s success.56
To further cement this commitment, employees can often only
attain the equity startups promise in stock option plans through vesting—a schedule by which employees are only able to purchase stock
in the company once they reach specific contractual timing or milestone factors.57 Importantly, the vesting schedule creates an incentive to keep employees not only working towards the company’s
success,58 but also from leaving to go to another venture;59 employees’ equity opportunities will not vest (be exercisable) if they do not
reach the timing or valuation milestones.60 Vesting schedules often
53

Id. at 610.
Id. at 595.
55
Id. at 592; see Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 1 (“An obvious motivation for
awarding such securities is to align incentives of employees with those of shareholders.”).
56
See id.
57
REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“Stock options . . . ’vest’ (become
exercisable) over time or upon the achievement of certain goals . . . .”); Smith,
supra note 16, at 586 (“The option-vesting schedule is the timetable by which the
employee may actually exercise her stock options to buy company stock. When
the company first grants the employee options, they are typically not exercisable
immediately to buy stock.”); see Linfield, supra note 14 (“Founder’s Stock is often subject to a vesting schedule.”).
58
Smith, supra note 16, at 586.
59
Booth, supra note 32, at 276–77 (commenting that equity compensation
structures can encourage employees to invest their time and energy in a company
with a “long-term view”).
60
See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228.
54
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take place over four years,61 meaning that the equity purchase opportunities promised to the employee would vest in increments and
normally take a full four years to be complete. Some scholars have
interpreted this schedule to have a more sinister meaning, noting that
the schedule often represents a “rough guess of how long an employee should stay at the startup in order for the firm to get the most
value out of the employee.”62
To further tie equity compensation to dedication and longevity
at the venture, startups often subject vesting to a cliff, a period of
time (often one year) that the employee must be at the company before they can actualize their first equity purchase opportunity.63
Meaning that, if the employee resigns any time before the cliff, they
forgo their ability to receive or purchase any stock64—irrespective
of how valuable that equity purchase may have been in their decision to join the company in the first place or how much of their overall compensation package was supplemented with equity.
In a startup, culture is everything—compensation included. This
inherent equity gambit requires long-term dedication for any sort of
payoff, and with it comes the blurring of lines between the work
product and the people who make it.
B.
Startup Culture as Told by Soylent and Uber
Employees’ willingness to make the lottery ticket65 gambit is a
trait that often goes hand-in-hand with other entrepreneurial, and
sometimes aberrant or even eccentric, behaviors. This eccentricity
is exemplified in the media through commentaries on Twitter CEO
Jack Dorsey’s fasting, infamous Theranos founder Elizabeth

61
Linfield, supra note 14; see also Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 4 (noting
that employee turnover after option grants is lower until time of vesting, at which
point retention value as an impetus for providing option grants is minimal).
62
Smith, supra note 16, at 600.
63
Linfield, supra note 14.
64
See Smith, supra note 16, at 586.
65
Smith, supra note 16, at 607–09.
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Holmes’ adherence to green juice,66 or the widespread use of the
meal replacement drink, Soylent, in lieu of taking time to eat.67
Noted technology author and programmer Clive Thompson
wrote that the popularity of Soylent in startup culture is part of an
“obsession with efficiency.”68 But, the idea of trading meals for protein drinks in the interest of getting back to work quicker—or not
taking a break at all69—serves as a dark commentary on startup culture as a whole. David Heinemeier Hansson, the creator of the Ruby
on Rails programming framework and co-founder of Basecamp,
along with co-author, CEO, and co-founder of Basecamp, Jason
Fried, express this sentiment in their book, It Doesn’t Have to Be
Crazy at Work:
Whenever executives talk about how their company
is really like a big ol’ family, beware. They’re usually not referring to how the company is going to protect you no matter what or love you unconditionally.
You know, like healthy families would. Their motive
is rather more likely to be a unidirectional form of
sacrifice: yours. . . . You’re not just working long
nights or skipping a vacation to further the bottom
line; no, no, you’re doing this for the family. Such a
blunt emotional appeal is only needed if someone is

66

Nicole Lyn Pesce, Most of Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s Intense Wellness
Habits Actually Make Sense, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 9:20 AM),
https://marketwatch.com/story/most-of-twitter-ceo-jack-dorseys-intense-wellness-habits-actually-make-sense-2019-04-15.
67
See CLIVE THOMPSON, CODERS: THE MAKING OF A NEW TRIBE AND THE
REMAKING OF THE WORLD 139–41 (2019); see also Brian X. Chen, In Busy Silicon Valley, Protein Powder Is in Demand, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2015), https://nytimes.com/2015/05/25/technology/in-busy-silicon-valley-protein-powder-is-indemand.html?_r=0.
68
THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 141.
69
See id. at 140–41 (“Several start-up programmers told me they kept their
pantries stocked with it. It was perfect for the nonstop workload endemic in Silicon Valley, the 14-hour-long jags of coding . . . .”).
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trying to make you forget about your rational selfinterest.70
This adherence to the success of the work product—and,
thereby, the company—can be interpreted as a variation on a theme
of the same deferred-payoff, all-for-one and one-for-all ideology required upon signing up to work at a startup in the first place. In other
words, if founders can sacrifice for the sake of success, other startup
employees can (or should), too.
Still, regardless of how one might view the advent of Soylent or
the culture that it may foster, its popularity is undeniable, as it has
broken free from the confines of Silicon Valley and been recently
introduced into thousands of “brick-and-mortar retail locations,”
such as Walmart, since April 2019.71 In the spirit of innovation,
Clive Thompson notes that “[t]his fetish for efficiency is what has
driven the delirious explosion of ‘on demand’ services” such as
quicker Amazon deliveries, or entire companies designed to do laundry, clean apartments, or shop for groceries.72 A more positive interpretation of this phenomenon is that products like Soylent illustrate the creation of entirely new subsets of industries that are based
on innovation, efficiency, and problem-solving.73 Like with Airbnb
and its impact on the world,74 the benefit or detriment of startup culture’s characteristics often lie in the eye of the beholder. And, much
like Airbnb itself, it can sometimes become a seemingly unstoppable
70

JASON FRIED & DAVID H. HANSSON, IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE CRAZY AT
WORK 77–78 (2018). Netflix notably presents a rare challenge to this ideology,
treating its employees as a “team” instead of a “family” as a foundational predicate of its business model. Vivian Giang, She Created Netflix’s Culture and It
Ultimately Got Her Fired, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3056662/she-created-netflixs-culture-and-it-ultimately-got-her-fired.
The reality that this is touted as an effective competitive edge for Netflix and is
viewed as somewhat unusual by employees illustrates the uniqueness of this approach. Land of the Giants, “Netflix is a team, not a family”, VOX, (June 23,
2020), https://www.vox.com/land-of-the-giants-podcast.
71
Marry Ellen Shoup, Soylent Rolls out to 4,378 Walmart Stores, Targets
20,000 Retail Locations Nationwide, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA (Apr. 8, 2019, 4:56
PM), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/04/08/Soylent-goes-nationwide-with-Walmart.
72
THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 141.
73
See id. at 139–41.
74
See Airbnb Impacts, supra note 10; BIVENS, supra note 12, at 4.
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force once set in motion—irrespective of the socioeconomic or legal
ramifications that ensue.75
However, sometimes the effects of eschewing social, business,
and legal norms are objectively negative. For instance, using trade
secret laws like the Defend Trade Secrets Act to shield diversity statistics under the auspice of trade secret protection provides companies with a mechanism to shield themselves from criticism in addition to heightening the diversity disparity for people of color, in particular. 76 Also, venture capital firms that prototypically fund companies like startups are notorious for placing far fewer investments
with women and people of color—just nine percent of 10,000 investor-backed ventures polled were run by women, under two percent
were run by Latinx founders, and only one percent were led by Black
founders.77 On the other side of the table, even when venture capital
firms themselves are run by people of color, a recent Stanford study
has shown that those firms incur more bias from investors, including
that investors “were unable to distinguish between the stronger and
weaker black-led teams.”78 Further, bias and scrutiny extend to age
as well; this issue was epitomized in a 2007 statement by Mark
Zuckerberg that “young people are just smarter.”79

75

See Paris Martineau, Inside Airbnb’s ‘Guerrilla War’ Against Local Governments, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-airbnbs-guerrilla-war-against-local-governments/ (reporting on conflicts between Airbnb and cities around country as cities try to enforce laws surrounding
short-term rentals, including collecting taxes).
76
See, Holman, supra note 20.
77
Mary Ann Azevedo, Untapped Opportunity: Minority Founders Still Being
Overlooked, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/untapped-opportunity-minority-founders-still-being-overlooked/.
78
Melissa De Witte, Venture Capital Funds Led by People of Color Face
More Bias the Better They Perform, Stanford Researchers Find, STAN. NEWS
SERV. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/08/12/race-influencesprofessional-investors-judgments/ (finding that investors analyzing venture capital teams encountered more difficulty distinguishing between strengths and weaknesses of racially diverse teams relative to white-male led teams).
79
Margaret Kane, Say What? ‘Young People Are Just Smarter’, CNET (Mar.
28, 2007, 7:57 AM), https://cnet.com/news/say-what-young-people-are-justsmarter/ (“‘I want to stress the importance of being young and technical,’ [Zuckerberg] stated, adding that successful startups should only employ young people
with technical expertise.”); see also Fried, supra note 20.
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Harassment, particularly sexual harassment, is another prevalent
facet of discriminatory behavior in the startup world. While fighting
an ongoing employment law battle with rideshare drivers over their
status as independent contractors or employees,80 2017 was the year
that Uber’s culture caught up with the company in another way: sexual harassment.81 In 2017, former Uber employee Susan Fowler
published an essay online that detailed the extensive sexual harassment that both she and her fellow female engineers endured:
Uber was a pretty good-sized company at that time,
and I had pretty standard expectations of how they
would handle situations like this. . . . [U]nfortunately, things played out quite a bit differently. When
I reported the situation, I was told by both HR and
upper management that even though this was clearly
sexual harassment and he was propositioning me, it
was this man’s first offense, and that they wouldn’t
feel comfortable giving him anything other than a
warning and a stern talking-to. Upper management
told me that “he was a high performer” (i.e. had stellar performance reviews from his superiors) and they
wouldn’t feel comfortable punishing him for what
was probably just an innocent mistake on his
part. . . . Once I had finished up my projects and saw
that things weren’t going to change, I . . . requested a
transfer. I met all of the qualifications for transferring
– I had managers who wanted me on their teams, and
80

See Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will
Shape The Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM),
https://forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employeesthe-answer-will-shape-the-sharing-economy/; see also Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble
With Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative that Worker Classification Fights, 81 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 107, 107–09 (2018) (arguing that “gig” economy narrative
constructed and furthered by companies behooves them at their workers’ expense,
in that narrative absolves companies from being responsible for their workers in
traditional ways by minimizing the connection between the company and its
workers).
81
Johana Bhuiyan, With Just Her Words, Susan Fowler Brought Uber to Its
Knees, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://vox.com/2017/12/6/16680602/susan-fowler-uber-engineer-recode-100-diversity-sexual-harassment.
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I had a perfect performance score – so I didn’t see
how anything could go wrong. And then my transfer
was blocked. According to my manager, his manager, and the director, my transfer was being blocked
because I had undocumented performance problems.82
Susan Fowler’s account brought about several internal investigations within Uber, including one conducted by the former Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder.83 Those investigations contributed to, among other things, the resignation of thenCEO Travis Kalanick.84 Fowler’s decision to speak out catalyzed an
outpouring of similar accounts from other women working at
startups, and forced a reckoning in the spirit of the #MeToo movement.85 Importantly, this facet of startup culture and the behavior
that feeds it are not exclusive to Uber, and this brand of harassment
translates to deficiencies in employee or investment diversity.86
The aim of this Note is not to criticize the equity compensation
regularly employed by startups or their unique culture. Instead, the
aim is to illustrate that startups are often boundary-pushing by nature
in how they contract with and regard employees. These traits, while
beneficial in some respects, can culminate to form a pervasive culture87 that can erode or violate the rights of their employees. Moreover, this Note identifies discrimination as a key reason that a startup
employee would walk away from their equity, an integral and coveted part of their compensation. Subsequently, this Note analyzes
how both a misunderstanding of young startups and associated gaps
in federal antidiscrimination laws deprive employees targeted by
82

Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year At Uber (Feb.
19, 2017), https://susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-verystrange-year-at-uber.
83
Bhuiyan, supra note 81.
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Id.
85
Id.
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See also Laila Alawa, Sexual Harassment in The Startup Industry Really
Isn’t Going Away Anytime Soon, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:48 PM),
https://forbes.com/sites/payout/2018/02/09/sexual-harassment-in-the-startup-industry-really-isnt-going-away-anytime-soon/.
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See JASON FRIED & DAVID H. HANSSON, REWORK 249 (2010) (“Culture is
the byproduct of consistent behavior.”).
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discrimination of their rights relative to these equity agreements.
Currently, employees who are the victims of discrimination have little to no recourse to recover when resignation feels like their only
choice.
Harkening back for a moment to the hypothetical about Alex—
the twenty-two-year old software engineer at a startup of eleven people who, for the past several months, has been harassed at work—
we can now add a few more critical, compounding pieces to Alex’s
story. Alex’s compensation is comprised of a $40,000 per year salary that includes the option to purchase up to 2,000 shares on a fouryear vesting schedule with a one-year cliff. Alex specifically sought
equity compensation as a condition of taking a lower cash salary and
agreeing to work at the company. Having only worked for the
startup for ten months, Alex has not yet reached the twelve-month
(one-year) cliff at which the opportunity to purchase 500 shares, or
twenty-five percent of the total over four years, would vest. Nonetheless, because the stalking and in-office harassment have yet to
cease, Alex still feels that there is no other recourse but to resign in
the interest of safety.
II.
THE NEW BLUE-COLLAR AND WHY IT MATTERS
Startups are not going anywhere—they are as inevitable as the
entrepreneurs that dream of them. And there is nothing wrong with
that. But, with that understanding, the reader should acknowledge
that startups do, in fact, push and change the legal landscape,88
whether or not the law is ready for such alterations or aberrations in
its use.89
In The Lean Startup, Eric Ries notes that “huge productivity increases made possible by modern management and technology have
created more productive capacity than firms know what to do
with.”90 By increasing productivity, firms can manufacture the necessary output without as much human power, inevitably creating a

88

Hobbs, supra note 9, at 1.
See BIVENS, supra note 12, at 4; Martineau, supra note 75; Ben-Shahar,
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dearth of traditional manufacturing positions91 in regions most affected by declines in traditional labor positions, such as the coal
mining industry of Kentucky, which saw the number of coal miners
in the state decrease by over half between 2008 to 2016.92 In the
midst of watching his livelihood, heritage, and town collapse as jobs
disappeared, former coalminer Rusty Justice decided to leave behind his coal-shipping and land-formation business and pivot to the
creation of a new startup: a computer programming boot camp
called Bit Source.93
Nine hundred fifty people applied for the first cohort.94 Of the
only eleven spaces available, Bit Source selected “a mine safety inspector, an underground miner, and a college-educated mechanic
who’d fixed conveyer belts in the mines.”95 After grueling days
learning programming languages like JavaScript and creating apps
that taught skills such as how to store and retrieve information from
a database, the now-programmers were able to compile their lessons
into jobs creating sites and applications.96 More importantly, they
were able to again contribute to the commerce and growth of their
community—not only by receiving “tent-pole salaries”97 that could
support other industries, but also in becoming activists for their own
communities by creating an application to address opioid addiction.98 In his book Coders, Clive Thompson notes of this coding revolution by stating that “[i]t’s become more of a ticket to the middle
class; something that the great mass of people can see as a route to
reasonably stable, enjoyable employment. It’s like, in other words,
91
Id. (citing Hale Stewart, US Manufacturing Is Not Dead,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 28, 2010, 1:48 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/us-manufacturing-is-not-dead/); see also James Manyika, et. al, Harnessing
Automation for a Future That Works, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2017),
https://mckinsey.com/featured-insights/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works (finding that almost half of all current labor jobs
could be automated, representing approximately fifteen trillion dollars in wages
to workers).
92
THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 343.
93
Id. at 344.
94
Id. at 345.
95
Id. at 345–46.
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Id. at 346–47.
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Id. at 344.
98
Id. at 347.
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pretty much what mining used to be around Kentucky.”99 For Rusty
Justice, “These are blue-collar workers . . . [a]nd this is blue-collar
work.”100
Moreover, this inquiry matters because the number of startups
like Bit Source and other associated coding jobs is only growing,
bringing with it the “rise of ‘mid-tech.’”101 Despite its eponymous
hold over the perceived quintessence of the software engineer, Silicon Valley only accounts for about eight percent,102 or approximately one-tenth103 of programming jobs in the United States. Yet,
when lawmakers want a brief on startups—particularly those heavily involved in tech, they turn directly to Silicon Valley—they haul
before them various tech CEOs at the helm of billion-dollar corporations.104
While Mark Zuckerberg is able to testify about the workings of
Facebook, that does not necessarily make him (or other like heads
of large startups) specifically able to inform lawmakers about the
needs of startups like Bit Source that are geographically, culturally,
or proportionally distinct from the prototypical Silicon Valley
model. If Bit Source in Eastern Kentucky is taken as a microcosm
for the growing mid-tech movement across the country, and there

99

Id. at 348.
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a degree at all.).
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08, 2017, 12:38 PM) [hereinafter The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding],
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Team, WIRED (July. 15, 2010, 7:00 AM) [hereinafter Why Congress Needs to Revive its Tech Support Team], https://wired.com/story/why-congress-needs-to-revive-its-tech-support-team/; Makena Kelly, Congress Isn’t Buying Mark Zuckerberg’s Pitch for Libra, The VERGE (Oct. 23, 2019, 5:37 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/23/20929313/mark-zuckerberg-hearing-congress-libra-calibra-facebook-maxine-waters.
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are far more programming jobs105 (and, presumably, startup-related
businesses or positions) scattered across the United States, then it is
concerning that Silicon Valley is still the point representative for this
movement. This is because Silicon Valley is not representative of
the entirety of startup culture.106 With Congress having long-disbanded the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”),107 lawmakers can easily have a very skewed understanding of startups by primarily, or only, targeting inquiries at the now-massive technology
companies that have since outgrown their status as startups, despite
once setting the tone for startup culture.108
Federal Communications Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel,
in an appeal to lawmakers to bring back the OTA, emphasized that,
As technology becomes ingrained in our everyday
lives, we may not always know just how it all
works. . . . The digital age is so complex that old
laws do not neatly capture how we interact with new
technologies, and understandable facts about how the
online world works are in short supply. . . . It’s especially difficult for legislators and regulators to develop this baseline of understanding when innovation can invert much of what we think we know so
quickly.109
Taking this more broadly, as was the edict of the OTA, this
would not only apply to advancing technology, but also to the
105
See THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is
Coding, supra note 102.
106
See The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding, supra note 102.
107
See Technology Assessment and the Work of Congress, PRINCETON [hereinafter OTA and the Work of Congress], https://www.princeton.edu/
~ota/ns20/cong_f.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). OTA was a Congressional
advisory group in service from 1972 until 1995 and provided a policy-focused
analytical approach to technology, science, and business that produced arguably
invaluable resources for lawmakers. See id.
108
See Why Congress Needs to Revive its Tech Support Team, supra note 104.
109
Jessica Rosenworcel, The Facebook Hearings Demonstrate the Need for
Technology Policy Experts in Congress, NBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018, 3:44 AM),
https://nbcnews.com/think/opinion/facebook-hearings-demonstrate-need-technology-policy-experts-congress-ncna865611.
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startups that utilize, engage in, and produce that technology. Moreover, without an in-depth picture of what is occurring across the
startup landscape, such a myopic analysis of startups could easily
lead lawmakers to overlook more obscure issues that affect only
startups of a certain region, culture, or—and critical to the inquiry
in this Note—size.
Although many issues may fall under this description, the one of
principal concern in this paper is that of size, due to its effect on the
disparate application of federal antidiscrimination laws. If you ask a
startup founder for their definition of a startup, the answer often contains the elements of risk, sacrifice, and innovation.110 The MerriamWebster dictionary defines it, among other things, as “a fledgling
business enterprise.”111 Here, too, there is no one-size-fits-all answer.112 Startups can have over 80 employees, or very few, and are
of varying ages and stages of investment.113 Crunchbase’s metrics
reflect that there were 4,032 startups founded in 2019 alone.114 As
of June 2020, out of the ten top-trending 2019-founded startups reflected on Crunchbase’s Leaderboard tool, three were listed as having only one-to-ten employees.115 The capitalization of those three
startups alone ranges from $2.8 million to $7 million dollars.116 Going back further to Crunchbase’s Leaderboard metrics for startups
founded in 2017, as of June 2020, the top trending startup117 with a
110

See Natalie Robehmed, What Is A Startup?, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2013, 8:42
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2020), Cabana, CRUNCHBASE https://crunchbase.com/organization/cabana-7453
(last visited June 23, 2020), Opora, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunchbase.com/organization/opora-technologies (last visited June 23, 2020).
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See Jupiter, supra note 115, Opora, supra note 115.
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capitalization of $2.6 million dollars is still indicated as having only
one-to-ten employees.118 Importantly, this is to say nothing about
these specific entities or their individual business practices. It is
simply a legal reality that, irrespective of the years in business or
level of investment, with fewer than fifteen employees, neither Title
VII nor the ADEA apply to any of them or to startups like them.119
In the age of what Eric Ries refers to as the “entrepreneurial renaissance,”120 society’s lack of understanding of startups and startup culture is more dire than ever. Ready or not, the law must adapt.
While this Note provides no one definite solution, the subsequent inquiry into antidiscrimination and employment law illuminates how the confluence of a company culture that is vulnerable to
elements of discrimination,121 a pay structure that binds employees’
compensation and future to the company itself,122 and a gap in federal antidiscrimination law depending on the company’s size culminate to leave some employees with little recourse to recover when
they feel forced to resign from a startup due to discriminatory behavior.
III.
ABOVE THE THRESHOLD: TITLE VII AND OTHER FEDERAL
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO WORK
A.
The Laws and Their History
It is necessary to first analyze the laws at play to understand how
damaging the deficiency of antidiscrimination protections in the
United States can be for startup employees attempting to recover for
equity compensation employment contracts. Chief among these, for
its breadth and applicability to the vulnerabilities of startup culture,
is Title VII.
As it was passed in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion,
118
Advekit, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunchbase.com/organization/advekit (last
visited Nov. 18, 2020).
119
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120
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121
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122
See Part I, Section A.
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sex, or national origin.”123 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lily
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 further amended Title VII124 to include “discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions, and marriage status for women.”125 Moreover,
Stephanie Bornstein expands on this in saying that “Title
VII . . . prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, pay, and other
‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of work, as well as the adoption of
policies or practices that ‘deprive any individual of employment opportunities’ ‘because of’ a protected classification . . . .”126 Applying to companies with fifteen or more employees,127 Title VII created the EEOC with the purpose of “enforc[ing] [its] statutory provisions against discrimination . . . .”128
Claims under Title VII take three forms: “disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and harassment,”129 though “harassment, stereotyping, and, for the protected classes of religion and pregnancy, failure to accommodate” are arguably sub-classifications of disparate
treatment.130 To make a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII,
an employee must claim that their employer intentionally discriminated against them.131 Key elements of this claim lie in the finding
that the employee was a member of a protected class and that they
were qualified for the employment or benefits thereof but were otherwise denied due to discrimination.132 Further, employee-claimants
can illustrate disparate impact by showing that their employer’s
123

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing, in editor’s note prepended,
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REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215.
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Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055,
1061 (2017).
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EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28.
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Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 663
(2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)).
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REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215.
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Bornstein, supra note 126, at 1061.
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REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215.
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Id.; Jennifer Issacs, Proving Title VII Discrimination in 2019, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/projects/no-limits/provingtitle-vii-discrimination-in-2019/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
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seemingly-neutral employment policy or systematized workplace
practice effectively discriminated against members of a Title VII
protected class.133 For disparate impact, employee-claimants need
not prove employer intentionality, unlike with disparate treatment.134
The most common form of Title VII claims, however, is harassment.135 A harassment claim could appear in the form of “denial of
an employment benefit for refusal to submit to sexual advances by
a supervisor.”136 For this “quid pro quo” harassment, courts may
hold employers responsible even if they were not aware of the harassment and had specific policies prohibiting harassment.137 Further, an employee can assert a harassment claim under Title VII by
showing that the workplace fostered a hostile environment for the
employee.138 “Hostile work environment” claims are those that allege that an employee, as a member of a protected class under Title
VII, was subjected by his or her employer to “unwelcome comments
or conduct” based on that protected status and that the comments or
conduct were substantial enough to “unreasonably [interfere] with
[the] employee’s ability to work effectively” because the comments
or conduct “created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.”139
Regarding hostile work environment harassment claims, Professor Mary Anne Franks from the University of Miami School of Law
notes that “EEOC guidelines state that employers are liable when
they have actual knowledge of the harassment and fail to act
promptly and effectively.”140 However, Professor Franks also points
133

Bornstein, supra note 126, at 1061.
REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215; see Issacs, supra note 132.
135
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137
Franks, supra note 128, at 664 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998)); see Crystal L. Norrick, Eliminating the Intent Requirement
in Constructive Discharge Cases: Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2006) (explaining that Supreme Court in Ellerth
found that harassment created a “tangible employment action” and “reasoned that,
in making tangible employment decisions, a supervisor uses her authority ‘to
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REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215.
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out that, when harassment does not correspond to a “tangible loss of
employment benefits,” employers are able to skirt liability by insisting that the plaintiff did not take “preventative or corrective” action,
and that the employer themselves “took reasonable care” to ameliorate the harassment.141 Further, in all three typical classes of Title
VII claims—disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment—the law allows employers to mount an affirmative defense if
they can demonstrate that the alleged discrimination against a protected class is a “bona fide occupational qualification,” and is necessary for the normal functioning of the business.142 In Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court further “delineate[d] two
categories of hostile work environment claims: (1) harassment that
‘culminates in tangible employment action,’ for which employers
are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence
of a tangible employment action, to which employers may assert an
affirmative defense.”143
Pursuant to the EEOC’s guidelines on federal laws that prohibit
workplace discrimination, “Title VII prohibits not only intentional
discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, national origin,
religion, or sex.”144 Professor Chuck Henson from the University of
Missouri School of Law notes that the aims of Title VII bring about
a cognitive dissonance between the idea that Title VII is supposed
to eradicate employment discrimination and the jurisprudential reality that Title VII is a delicate balancing act between preserving
business and managerial autonomy while also preventing the most
141

Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 542 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998)).
REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215; see Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 406 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439
n.9 (1971)) (explaining that “[a]s is clear from Griggs, . . . and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines for employers seeking to determine
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such test are impermissible unless shown . . . to be ‘predictive of or significantly
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relevant to the job . . . .’”).
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Norrick, supra note 137, at 1818 (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542
U.S. 129, 143 (2004), to illustrate when an affirmative defense to alleged discrimination may be raised relative to Supreme Court’s analysis in Suders).
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insidious and obvious forms of discrimination.145 Professor Henson
further dissects the background of the legislation that eventually became Title VII, noting that prior drafts contained the specific purpose “that it is the national policy to protect the right of the individual to be free from [employment] discrimination.”146 This underlying purpose, albeit not written into the language of the law, nonetheless has bearing on the remedial outcomes of Title VII cases: For
example, in Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court further expanded upon a court’s duty to remedy as outlined by the principles of both the “prophylactic” intent of Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination as well as the corrective purpose served by
Title VII to help “make whole” the victims of employment discrimination.147 Moreover, in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Justice O’Connor delved further into this
fundamental Title VII duty in quoting the Abermarle Paper opinion:
“[t]he ‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end . . . by ‘achiev[ing] equality of employment
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group . . . over other employees.’”148 As outlined by the above cases, as deficient as Title VII may be regarding
its limited aims as described by Professor Henson,149 it nevertheless
does attempt to make whole again those wronged by discrimination
under Title VII.
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See Chuck Henson, Title VII Works — That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U.
MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41, 43, 96 (2012).
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Id. at 52 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963)).
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Sheila Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and
the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 561, 573 (1986) (citing Abermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 405, 417–18); Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Constructive Discharge: The Misapplication of Constructive Discharge Standards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 45 n. 27 (1995)
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Although this inquiry primarily focuses on Title VII, startup culture’s many problems with age discrimination also merit a brief
analysis of the ADEA. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 applies to companies of twenty or more employees150 and is
designed to prevent employers from discriminating against employees aged forty or older.151 Further, the ADEA is substantially similar
to Title VII, as Sheila Finnegan notes, citing to Lorillard v. Pons,
that “[t]he Supreme Court has observed, ‘the prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’”152
The primary difference between these two laws lies in the
ADEA’s adoption of the remedial methods of the Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”)153 in that a violation of the ADEA is considered
tantamount to a violation of the FLSA.154 Moreover, under FLSA
standards, employer violations of the ADEA merit backpay.155 Finally, the ADEA does not empower courts with the discretion to
waiver on remedial standards, which they have under Title VII, and
the law does not require employees to reasonably mitigate damages
or have such an amount deducted from a backpay award.156
B.

Recourse and Recovery Available under Title VII and the
ADEA
For the purposes of this Note, what is perhaps most important
about laws like Title VII and the ADEA is their ability to provide
legal credibility to the claims of those who have been provably discriminated against. In short, under antidiscrimination laws like Title
VII, employees can bring claims that have the ability to make them
150
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whole again, to the extent backpay and other damages can remedy
the wrong done to them.
The efficacy of these remedies are complicated, however, by the
manner in which the employer terminates the employee. For example, when an employee resigns due to, for instance, sexual harassment discrimination, their best, and likely only, recourse is to recover via constructive discharge due to a hostile workplace environment157—treatment “so [intolerable] that any reasonable person
would [feel] compelled to quit.”158 Were the employee, instead, directly fired, and exhibited reasonable efforts to mitigate the damage
caused by lost wages,159 that employee would “presumptively” be
entitled to backpay160 if their employer violated Title VII in firing
them.161 Importantly, Title VII and the ADEA allow courts to factor
in the value of stock options as other forms of compensation in determining backpay, frontpay, or other damages to award an employee.162 Under Abermarle Paper, both current and former employees can recover backpay for violations of Title VII.163 However, if
the employee resigns due to a hostile and discriminatory environment in the workplace, they must first prove that they were constructively discharged in order to have the ability to recover backpay or
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Id. at 561–62.
Kende, supra note 147, at 40.
159
See id. at 41 (noting that there is a “freedom” that stems from direct discharge as opposed to resignations, as reasonable effort to mitigate is a fairly low
standard under Ford Motor Co.).
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necessary by the court. Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 954–56 (1st
Cir. 1995) (upholding award of front pay, back pay, and stock options value); see
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 n.8. (2004).
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Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62 (citing Abermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421–22 (1975)); see Kende, supra note 147, at 41 n.13
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 458 U.S. 219, 231–
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other damages.164 In other words, employees who resign cannot presumptively recover under Title VII or like antidiscrimination laws,
as they might have been able to had they been fired outright.165
The Supreme Court declared in its landmark constructive discharge case, Suders, that “Title VII encompasses employer liability
for a constructive discharge.”166 In finding that a former Pennsylvania State Police employee was discriminated against sufficient to
bring a constructive discharge claim under Title VII,167 the Supreme
Court then defined constructive discharge for this purpose to mean
“[a]n employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. . . . The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?”168 Or, as the
Court noted, “essentially, [the plaintiff] presents a ‘worse case’ harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”169
The Court further stated that “a prevailing constructive discharge
plaintiff is entitled to all damages available for formal discharge,”
which includes, depending on the circumstances, damages resulting
from the resignation, backpay, and frontpay.170 The Court went further to acknowledge the “‘universal recognition’” of constructive
discharge in lower courts as a remedial route in discrimination
cases,171 and referred to NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp.172 as
the first circuit court that allowed for backpay as a financial remedy.
In terms of constructive discharge as historically addressed in
circuit courts, Finnegan notes that early Title VII and constructive
discharge cases, such as Young v. Southwest Savings & Loan Association in the Fifth Circuit, provided the foundation for the use of
164
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constructive discharge as a remedy to instances of employment discrimination in violation of federal law.173 However, lower courts
have not yet agreed on one single test for constructive discharge,
with circuits split on requirements of employer intent.174 Given variable interpretations of the employer intent requirement, even in the
wake of Suders, it is yet inconclusive whether Suders definitively
codified the majority view of constructive discharge as not requiring
intent, although it is arguable that it has done just that, given Justice
Thomas’s dissent in the case.175 Accordingly, the majority view is
based on the understanding that an employee is constructively discharged from their place of employment if the discrimination results
in a hostile workplace to the end that any reasonable person in the
same position would feel they must resign.176 This differs from the
contrasting minority application of constructive discharge, which, in
addition to the reasonable person requirement, requires the employee to show their former employer had the specific intent to create those intolerable conditions in an effort to force the employee to
resign.177 Should Suders not hold conclusively on this matter, it merits a brief explanation into the circuit split due to its effect on an
employee’s ability to even begin to bring a constructive discharge
action under the Title VII framework.
In the Fifth Circuit wage discrimination and constructive discharge case Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., the
court held that the plaintiff was not required to prove that her employer intended for her to resign in order to put forth a constructive
discharge claim.178 This was the foundation for several variations of
tests requiring, at least, lesser showings of employer intent adopted
by circuits beyond the Fifth, including the First, Second, Third,
173

Finnegan, supra note 147, at 563 (citing Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
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Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia.179 Conversely, the
minority requirement is epitomized in the Tenth Circuit case Muller
v. United States Steel Corp., where the court found a violation of
Title VII, but would not award damages in the form of backpay to
the plaintiff because the court did not find enough evidence to show
that the employer intended to force the plaintiff to resign, and
thereby could not find that the plaintiff was constructively discharged.180
Although the compensatory effect of a finding of constructive
discharge differs for Title VII and the ADEA—with the ADEA
viewing constructive discharge as a violation of the FLSA, thereby
avoiding the court discretion and damage mitigation standards that
Title VII requires181—both courses of federal antidiscrimination law
use constructive discharge in order to allow employee-plaintiffs who
resigned from their positions to recover backpay.182 And, as the
Court reiterated in Suders, even under Title VII, where constructive
discharge is an equitable remedy subject to court discretion, victims
are nonetheless entitled to the same remedies as are victims under
the ADEA, including backpay and damages due to their resignation.183 In summary, both Title VII and the ADEA provide constructive discharge remedies to allow employees who resigned as a result
of discrimination to be made whole by holding their employer liable
for backpay.184 Put another way, constructive discharge under both
laws essentially puts an employee who resigned due to discrimination in the same shoes as one who was terminated on the basis of
discrimination, allowing them to recover the same measure of damages.185
Professor Mark Kende notes that the heightened requirements of
a showing of constructive discharge, as opposed to a case where an
179

Id. at 52–53; see also Finnegan, supra note 147, at 564 n.15.
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employee was fired, results in subjecting employees to continued
discrimination.186 He further examines the public policy directives—somewhat similarly to Professor Henson’s assessment of
cognitive dissonance with Title VII’s aims187—that cause courts to
utilize these heightened standards of recovery because courts place
emphasis on allowing employers and employees to remedy disagreements within the company such that they never enter into
court.188 Kende’s rationale is that public policy directives emphasize
both retaining the integrity of a business’ internal resolution mechanisms, reducing court intervention, as well as on limiting the potential windfall for employees in the event of “the smallest sign of
discrimination.”189
Nevertheless, however questionable a court’s application of Title VII may be or however successful an employee’s efforts to recover backpay are thereunder, employees that have been provably
wronged by discrimination still have codified pathways for recovery. The pathways are only further emboldened by Suders if one
construes the holding as definitively supporting the majority view,
which is in favor of affording discrimination victims easier access
to recourse without the intentionality requirement.190
Put plainly, a judgment indicating a violation of Title VII or the
ADEA is, by the sheer nature of the offense, a showing of discrimination having occurred. An employer may argue, as an affirmative
defense, that their discriminatory scheme is permissible under Title
VII, therefore leaving the employee unable to take any remedial action.191 But the affirmative defense only allows the discriminatory
behavior, it does not erase the fact that it occurred. For many employees who have a cause of action, showing a Title VII violation is
186
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not, by itself, sufficient to prove a successful constructive discharge
claim.192 However, even in the case where an employee resigns, and
cannot presumptively recover backpay,193 the validity of a court
finding that the employee was discriminated against by their former
employer can bolster the employee’s constructive discharge argument.194 Such a finding lends both clarity and credibility to a plaintiff-employee’s cause in stating a claim that is, by definition, “harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point” such that any reasonable
person would also resign.195 Put another way, once an employee resigns due to discrimination, they are no longer presumptively due
damages.196 However, it is easier for that employee to prove they are
due damages when they can illustrate that their employer tangibly
violated Title VII or the ADEA.197
Harkening back to the hypo from the end of Part III, were Alex
to have worked at a company of fifteen people instead of eleven,
Alex would be employed at a company to which Title VII applied.198
As such, Alex could bring a claim of constructive discharge as having been harassed, and therefore discriminated against, in an arguably hostile workplace where Alex’s employer was presumptively in
violation of Title VII. Given Suders, Alex’s claim may or may not
be subject to the employer intent requirement in addition to the reasonable person standard of constructive discharge.199 But, and of the
utmost importance, Alex would have the ability to bring forth a
claim of discrimination under the protection of Title VII. This would
192
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allow Alex’s claim of constructive discharge to be predicated upon
the Title VII violation and potentially allow Alex to recover the
damages that resulted from the harassment and resultant resignation.
While it will never erase the discrimination, Alex has the potential
to be made legally and financially whole to the extent possible by
the discretion of the court under, as Justice O’Connor stated in Ford
Motor Co., the ideology that Title VII’s “primary objective” is to
eradicate employment discrimination.200
However, Alex, in working at a startup of eleven people to which
Title VII does not apply,201 is deprived of that protection. Hinging
on the fifteen-employee mark, what is illegal under Title VII at a
company with just four more employees, is not illegal where Alex
worked. Because Title VII, or any federal antidiscrimination law
that has a minimum floor, does not protect employees like Alex that
fall under that floor. Put another way, any startup that has fewer than
fifteen employees—irrespective of the capital that startup has raised,
the level of commerce it does, or the work culture it promotes—is
not under the purview of Title VII, the ADEA, or associated federal
antidiscrimination laws that have a minimum floor. Given the rise
of startups of every shape and size across the nation,202 this is an
unsustainable and overtly concerning model.
IV.
BELOW THE THRESHOLD: WHEN FEDERAL
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS DO NOT APPLY
Even under the protection of federal antidiscrimination laws like
Title VII and the ADEA, employees’ presumptive ability to receive
damages for wrongs done to them shifts to a structure of constructive discharge, forcing employees to prove that their resignation was
one of last resort.203 It is the very fact of their resignation—or, rather, that they were not directly fired as a tangible offense under

200
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these laws—that fundamentally shifts the inquiry.204 Nonetheless,
employees still have a designated pathway to recovery.
Yet, this is not necessarily the case where an employer does not
fall under the purview of these laws. While employees may still have
potential avenues of recourse—such as more restrictive state laws,
theories of unjust enrichment or breach of contract, the FLSA, and
its subsidiary Equal Pay Act—there are none as targeted and powerful as the protection given under Title VII, further solidified in
resounding cases such as Suders.205
A.
When State Laws are Not Enough
The EEOC acknowledges that, even beyond the antidiscrimination laws under its enforcement power, like Title VII and the ADEA,
there may be different or more restrictive state laws that still apply.206 Similar to section 633 of the ADEA,207 Title VII Section
2000(e)-7 stipulates:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt
or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State,
other than any such law which purports to require the
doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.208
State antidiscrimination laws, however, are not universally more
protective to employees than Title VII, as states range from extending certain antidiscrimination protections to companies of one
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employee to the Title VII limit of fifteen employees.209 Furthermore,
states do not always guarantee that these protections mirror those
Title VII protected classes such as race, national origin, or sex.210
Alabama, for instance, has no policy on sexual harassment,211 with
the Alabama Supreme Court formally declaring in Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc. that “[i]t is well settled that Alabama does not
recognize an independent cause of action of sexual harassment. Instead, claims of sexual harassment are maintained under commonlaw tort theories . . . .”212 Georgia is similar in that, while it does
have a Fair Employment Practices Act that extends discrimination
protections to those protected classes that mirror Title VII, its equivalent law only applies to public agencies’ officers and employees,
not private employers.213
B.

A Last Resort: Courts’ Reluctance to Use Equitable
Principles to Remedy Discriminatory Wrongs
As suggested by Alabama’s deference to other legal remedies in
lieu of direct antidiscrimination statutes, there are also tort and contract remedies under which employees can attempt to recover financially.214 However, such methods may prove inadequate as they do
not directly address financial loss as the result of discriminatory
treatment.215 Nonetheless, some scholars have put forward novel
ideas on how an employee could recover under these less codified
legal theories. For example, in her assessment of the forfeiture of
employee stock options in the case of involuntary termination, Karen Madsen presents remedies that may prove useful when applied
209
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210
See Discrimination and Harassment in the Workplace, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURE (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/employment-discrimination.aspx.
211
See Ally Windsor Howell, 2 Ala. Pers. Inj. & Torts § 11:12 (2019 ed.).
212
Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So.2d 820, 825 n.6 (Ala. 1999).
213
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-21 (West 2019).
214
See Stevenson, 762 So.2d at 825 n.6.
215
See Karen A. Madsen, Employee Stock Options: Is Complete Forfeiture of
Non-Vested Stock Options Fair and Equitable When an Employee is Involuntarily
Terminated Without Cause, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 226–27, 330–35
(1993).
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to employees who resign under exceptional circumstances, like, for
instance, pervasive discrimination.216 Madsen, in her inquiry, questions the fairness of allowing companies to contractually promise
employees equity and thereby reap the benefits of doing so, only to
terminate the employee before their equity has vested.217 While
Madsen’s analysis only addresses employees who were terminated
for legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes,218 it can also apply to
employees who were discriminatorily terminated or resigned due to
pervasive discrimination. Indeed, Madsen’s analysis is particularly
relevant in those cases given that her aim is to highlight the inequity
of equity compensation schemes219 and illustrate the necessity of
other forms of payment, such as pro rata vesting.220
In assessing further equitable remedies beyond contractual interpretation, Madsen proposes recourse such as unjust enrichment, substantial performance, and promissory estoppel.221 However, not all
will apply in discrimination cases. Remedies such as promissory estoppel,222 for example, traditionally require consideration in the
form of the employee not terminating their employment.223 Unjust
enrichment, however, may apply, given that it arises in situations
where one party retains a benefit conferred by another party in a
legally-unjustifiable manner, and is, therefore, liable to make whole
the party that conferred the benefit, as the receiving party was unjustly enriched by that benefit.224 In support, Madsen points to Lucas
v. Segrave Corp. where the court held that employees wrongfully
216

See id. at 217–19, 226–27, 330–35.
See id. at 214.
218
See id. at 213–14, 224.
219
See id. at 224. (“This problem is particularly disturbing in the case of an
unsophisticated employee who, without the advice of a lawyer, may not foresee
the potential forfeiture problems associated with the vesting/termination provisions of a stock option grant before signing it.”).
220
See Madsen, supra note 215, at 214, 224–35.
221
See id. at 230–34.
222
Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Promissory estoppel
is, essentially, a remedy to detrimental reliance wherein the party that perpetrated
the injustice (or breaking of the promise) can be required to uphold the promise
to prevent the injustice or inequity. Id.
223
Madsen, supra note 215, at 234.
224
See id. at 232–33; Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
217

2020]

UNVESTED

341

terminated before the onset of their pension were, in fact, due their
pension benefits, as their employer was unjustly enriched by their
work.225 In reference to stock options, Madsen notes that “the company has reaped the benefits of an employee’s hard work, creative
ideas, and commitment. In return, the employee loses valuable stock
options and does not get his or her part of the bargain.”226 Yet, Lucas
is nevertheless predicated upon a breach of contract,227 which constitutes a tangible wrong done by the company to the employees and
is recognized by the court as requiring an equitable remedy for the
company’s unjust enrichment.228 Moreover, although courts recognize unjust enrichment among several other equitable remedies,
there is also a longstanding predisposition to limit contractual interpretation to the terms of the contract already agreed-upon by the
parties.229 This is to say, unless specifically made illegal, as under
federal antidiscrimination law, discriminatory firing and constructive discharge are not, in and of themselves, tangible, actionable legal wrongs.
Regarding the integrity of contracts and how courts have historically held on issues related to stock options and other fringe employment benefits, Madsen highlights several cases where courts
considered, in exceptional circumstances, the contracts granting equity or stock options to employees.230 One case in particular, Langer
v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., could prove helpful to victims of discrimination. In that case, the Eighth Circuit held that circumstances
not contemplated within the bounds of the contract were not grounds
225
Madsen, supra note 215, at 232–33 (citing Lucas v. Segrave Corp., 277 F.
Supp. 338, 338, 342 (D. Minn. 1967)).
226
See id. at 233.
227
Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 344–45.
228
Madsen, supra note 215, at 232–33 (citing Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 338,
342).
229
See Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for
Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 672 n.143,
675–76 (2009) (citing Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569
(N.Y. 1978)) (“There exists an unavoidable tension between the concept of freedom of contract, which has long been basic to our socioeconomic system, and the
equally fundamental belief that an enlightened society must to some extent protect
its members from the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market system.”).
230
Madsen, supra note 215, at 217–21.
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for depriving the employee of their contractual right to stock options.231 In Langer, the court held the sale of the employer’s business
to be an extraordinary circumstance not considered in the contract
that granted options to the employee.232 Therefore, the plaintiff’s
options were not “invalid,” as suggested by the defendant-employer
upon the sale of their business.233 The case was reversed and remanded to lower courts for discernment of the damages due to the
plaintiff in light of the Eighth Circuit’s findings.234 However, Oracle
Corp. v. Falotti does note in an analysis of Langer that the Eighth
Circuit, despite finding that the “plaintiff’s working for the defendant for two years was ‘full consideration’ for his right to exercise his
stock options”, limited Langer to already-vested options in a situation of termination without cause.235 While Oracle Corp. does subsequently carve out instances of ADEA236 and Title VII237 antidiscrimination as situations in which similar limitations to damages recovery, as in Langer, on “incrementally-vesting stock-option
plan[s]” or the implementation of them do not apply, that analysis
solely addresses federal antidiscrimination recourse.238 Citing
Langer, among other cases, Williamson v. Moltech Corp. is potentially helpful in interpreting stock option rights under wrongful termination more generally by stating that, “if the plaintiff’s employment had been wrongfully terminated, his stock option rights would
not be terminated.”239
Further, if a plaintiff-employee were able to successfully argue
that, even if not covered by either federal or state antidiscrimination
statutes, the extenuating circumstances of the pervasive
231
Langer v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 420 F.2d 365, 369 (1970); Madsen, supra note 215, at 221.
232
Langer, 420 F.2d at 369; Madsen, supra note 215, at 221.
233
Langer, 420 F.2d at 367.
234
Id. at 369–70.
235
Oracle Corp. v. Falotti, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d,
319 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).
236
See Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1243–44, 1247 (10th
Cir. 2000) (damages for potential unrealized gains on stock were granted where
defendant forced plaintiff to exercise his stock options upon termination in violation of the ADEA).
237
See Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 954–56 (1st Cir. 1995).
238
See Oracle Corp., 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
239
Williamson v. Moltech Corp., 261 A.D.2d 538, 539 (1999).
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discrimination that effectively caused their resignation were beyond
the circumstances contemplated in the option contract, it is possible
they could nevertheless have the contract terms construed in their
favor. Madsen notes that “[i]n cases where the terms of the contract
may be ambiguous, a court will consider the circumstances of the
termination.”240
This is, however, in steep contrast with Fredericks v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., where the court held that an end to the plaintiff’s employment also terminated the employee’s stock option rights, even
if the termination was a resignation “induced . . . by humiliations
and harassment.”241 There, the court distinguished Langer: “the
plaintiff’s termination of employment . . . was neither unusual nor
unforeseeable” in finding the contract unambiguous.242 Although
the court readily acknowledged that a forced resignation is neither a
traditional discharge nor a voluntary termination, the district court
nonetheless found that the plaintiff could not recover damages for
stock options unexercised as a result of the forced termination given
that the defendant-employer had the “absolute right” per plaintiff’s
employment contract to discharge the plaintiff-employee.243 The
court went further to distinguish the harassment-forced resignation
from a finding of bad-faith, as there had been in Gaines v. Monroe
Calculating Machine Co., by noting that in Fredericks there was no
unfounded breach of the employment contract.244 In short, not even

240
Madsen, supra note 215, at 221 (citing Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
241
Fredericks, 331 F. Supp. at 422, 427–28.
242
Id. at 426.
243
See id. at 427 n.2, 28–31 (while court denied plaintiff’s first claim regarding damages following defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff to exercise stock options, plaintiff was permitted to explore damages to a trust that resulted from
plaintiff’s firing.); see also Smith, supra note 16 (“Under the at-will doctrine, an
employer may terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or for no reason.
Precedents in California and Delaware, as well as other states, make it reasonably
clear that it is permissible under the at-will employment doctrine to fire an employee because she became too expensive given the terms of her stock option
plan.”).
244
See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 426.
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a resignation forced by harassment245 constituted bad faith such that
it would implicate a breach of the employment contract sufficient to
allow recovery for an employee with damages for stock options not
exercisable as a result of that harassment-induced resignation.246
The Fredericks holding illustrates a core tenet of contract law in
that courts have a long-standing aversion to interfering with the
“sanctity of the bargain,” or the terms of a mutually-agreed-upon
contract, even if it erodes the equitable recompense due to victims
of injustice.247 Equitable or other contract remedies such as promissory estoppel, unconscionability, and the finding of a contract of adhesion have fallen out of favor in courts in deference to protecting
the “unfettered freedom of contract.”248 With specific reference to
the bad faith distinguished in Fredericks, courts have a predilection
for finding no erosion of good faith where the contract can be construed as allowing such actions249—even if those actions are as severe as effectively inducing a resignation.250 Professor Carolyn Edwards of Marquette University Law School references Centerre
Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Distrib’s, Inc.:
The imposition of a good faith defense to the call for
payment . . . transcends the performance or enforcement of a contract and in fact adds a term to the
agreement which the parties had not included . . . . This court is not willing to rewrite the
agreement . . . .251
As with the equitable remedies referenced in Madsen’s analysis,
some remedies may necessitate that a court find a breach of

245

See id. It is important to note that the harassment in Fredericks in no way
suggests it was of a nature targeted towards any Title VII or otherwise federally
or state-protected class.
246
See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 427–31.
247
Edwards, supra note 229, at 675–76.
248
Id. at 652, 671–78.
249
Id. at 680.
250
See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 427.
251
Edwards, supra note 229, at 680 n.181 (citing Centerre Bank of Kan. City,
N.A. v. Distrib’s, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
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contract252 or bad faith on behalf of the employer253—tangible offenses for which courts are not then responsible for construing as an
equitable remedy, often seen as “rewrit[ing] the agreement.”254
However, this freedom and integrity of the contract is by itself
questionable with contracts that contain an inordinate amount of equity compensation, as is typical in startups due to the notable lack of
liquidity that is quintessential to the business model.255 Madsen alludes to the concerning reality that many mid-level or legally-unsophisticated employees may not understand or contemplate the reality of the potential forfeiture of this compensation in that they may
not understand the increased complexities of equity-heavy compensation agreements relative to cash.256 In suggesting that some equity
compensation agreements may even be contracts of adhesion,
wherein employees were proffered the contract in a manner that
gave them no true bargaining power or choice, Madsen further questions the equity of courts applying wide stock option termination
provisions when employees may not have had the sophistication or
bargaining power to fully enter into such an agreement.257
In short, avenues for recovery post-resignation under state and
federal common law are constrained by rigid contract law frameworks and a general lack of continuity in antidiscrimination laws
that could protect employees in the absence of federal laws like Title
VII and the ADEA. This can leave employees in a precarious position: In the absence of federal laws, state laws, or common law
breach of contract claims, employees lack the grounds to state a
claim that is not purely seeking an equitable remedy at the discretion
252
Madsen, supra note 215, at 232 (citing Lucas v. Segrave Corp., 277 F.
Supp. 338, 344–45 (D. Minn. 1967)). In Lucas, the plaintiffs’ allegation that their
firing deprived them of their pension benefits and resulted in unjust enrichment
to the employer was sufficient to state a claim. See Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 344–
45, 350.
253
Madsen, supra note 215, at 227 (citing Gaines v. Monroe Calculating
Mach. Co., 188 A.2d 179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963)) In Gaines, employeeplaintiff was permitted to recover damages based on option contract where plaintiff’s termination was in “bad faith for the purpose of destroying the option.”
Gaines, 188 A.2d at 185, 186–88.
254
Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 48.
255
See Smith, supra note 16, at 586, 589–93.
256
See Madsen, supra note 215, at 224, 234–35.
257
Id. at 234–35.
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of the courts. Moreover, given courts’ reluctance to award equitable
remedies in such situations, these employees are even further
harmed.
C.

State Law and Equitable Remedy in a Hypothetical
Approach
With reference to the Alex hypothetical, Alex potentially has far
fewer avenues of recourse at a company of eleven employees than
at a company of fifteen—and, regarding state antidiscrimination
laws, their recourse would change geographically. Were Alex to
work at a startup in California, for instance, Alex would be under
the purview of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act,
which prevents discrimination on the basis of “race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or
military or veteran status of any person . . . .”258 This law further requires that even employers with five or more employees provide
sexual harassment training.259 In California, Alex could, therefore,
follow a similar procedure to the recourse available under Title VII,
bringing suit for constructive discharge on the basis of discrimination and their employer’s creation of a hostile workplace.260 However, given that the substantial majority of startup and related positions are outside of Silicon Valley,261 Alex could just as well be
working at a startup anywhere in the nation and, therefore, be subject to the potentially lesser protection of a different state’s laws.
Were Alex to work at a startup in Florida, for instance, Alex
would not be able to successfully bring such a suit, as Florida’s Civil
Rights Act of 1992 only extends antidiscrimination protection to
workers at a place of employment with fifteen or more
258

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12940 (West 2019).
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12950.1(h)(1) (West 2019).
260
See Thompson v. Tracor Flight Sys., Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 102–108
(Ct. App. 2001) (noting that California state law cases on constructive discharge
rest on the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law on the issue
and upholding a successful constructive discharge claim in the midst of untenable
working conditions).
261
See THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is
Coding, supra note 102.
259
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employees.262 This is functionally no more protective than Title VII
itself, and in fact, it requires dual filing with both Florida and the
EEOC, which further complicates recourse with differing claim and
deadline requirements.263 This would leave Alex to resort to civil
equitable remedies, such as unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel,
or a finding of a contract of adhesion. However, as with Fredericks,
given the reality that Alex was not fired but, instead, resigned, courts
would likely be reluctant to find against the terms of the contract264—even in the case of a harassment-induced resignation.265
The tacit inability to bring a claim of discrimination, i.e., to pinpoint
a tangible offense upon which Alex could predicate a claim in order
to recover damages, results in an effective lack of recourse for employees in such situations. Put another way, it is easier for employees to prove that they have been wronged when a law is broken and
damages can be proven outside of an equitable remedy at the discretion of the court. For, as with Fredericks, under an equitable remedy
theory, employees may not be entitled to recovery at all, no matter
the gravity of their employers’ actions and the resulting injustice.266
In summary, with cases of discrimination, a company with fewer
than fifteen employees may not be held liable for discriminatory
conduct that would be illegal at a company with fifteen or more employees.267 Failing federal law, state law, like California’s Fair
262

FLA. STAT. § 760.01–02(7)(2019); see EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28.
263
Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, U.S.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N (last visited Nov. 18, 2020),
https://eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm. Often, even if the charge is eligible for review from the EEOC due to Title VII eligibility, the claim must nonetheless be
dually filed within the state at a Fair Employment Practice Agency (“FEPA”). See
id. Filing and claim requirements, as well as deadlines, may differ between these
agencies despite the dual filing requirement. See id. Florida is one such dual-filing
state, with several local FEPA offices. State and Local Agencies: Miami District
Office, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N https://eeoc.gov/
field/miami/fepa.cfm; see State and Local Agencies, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
EMPLOYMENT COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/field-office/miami/fepa.
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See Centerre Bank of Kan. City, N.A. v. Distrib’s, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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Employment and Housing Act,268 may be more protective than Title
VII and the ADEA. In this case, employees are more protected than
they would be under federal law alone. However, this protection is
only as ironclad as each state’s own civil rights statues, and there is
no universal grant of greater protection than that given by federal
law.269 In states like Alabama270 and Georgia,271 for instance, there
is no such enhanced protection. Protection may be, in fact, severely
deficient relative to discriminatory offenses, given that Alabama entirely lacks a state civil rights statute save that for prohibiting age
discrimination.272 When an employee cannot find recourse under
federal or state antidiscrimination law, they may find recourse in
equitable remedies.273 However, as discussed in Fredericks,274
courts may not positively construe such arguments in the event of a
harassment-induced resignation. In short, without a ubiquitous, federally imposed grant of recourse, as available under Title VII, the
ADEA or other federal antidiscrimination laws, employees in companies with fewer than fifteen employees may have little legal recourse if they resign due to a discriminatory work environment.
While such employees may still be able to recover damages, that
268

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12940(a) (West 2019).
There is a notable and prescient corollary to this with the Bostock decision
recently announced by the Supreme Court. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Nos.
17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 (U.S. June 15, 2020). By bringing LGBTQIA+ status
under Title VII as a protected class, the Supreme Court ruled that employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is illegal under federal antidiscrimination law. See id. at 2. As Julia Reinstein and Amber Jamieson note, prior to Bostock, only twenty-one states had heightened employment
protections for queer folx, and “roughly half of the more than 8 million LGBTQ
people in the US lived in states without explicit protections if they experienced
discrimination at work.” Julia Reinstein & Amber Jamieson, The Supreme Court’s
LGBTQ Decision Will Have Huge Impacts for Those in States With No Prior Protections,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Jun.
15,
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PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/supreme-court-lgbtq-gaytransgender-lesbian-decision.
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ability is, at best, confounded by unequal state civil rights statutes
and the somewhat mercurial discretion of the courts in granting equitable remedies. At worst, should protective state laws not apply
and no equitable remedy be suitable, employees may not be able to
recover whatsoever for their discrimination-induced termination
and resultant economic injustice.
CONCLUSION
Startups span the nation275 as companies of varying shapes,
sizes, and valuations.276 They are, by their very nature, boundarypushing, risk-taking, adolescent enterprises.277 And often, they are
small. Or, at the very least, they begin that way.
Every company has to start somewhere. Employees with an entrepreneurial spirit and a willingness to bind their fate to the company in the hopes of success make the deferred-payoff investment
gamble. In doing so, they also bind themselves up in startup culture—a culture that is defined as much by hackathons and ping-pong
as it is by a payment structure that seeks only those who are willing
to sacrifice for the sake of the company’s future. As Professor Abraham Cable from the University of California Hastings College of
Law notes, “[E]mployee investors are both a cause of the mature
startup and a significant risk-barer of the phenomenon.”278 And so,
the iterative, boundary-breaking rush to “done” begins.
But “done” is not perfect. Nor is it better when a startup becomes
so entrenched in its own success that many employees suffer from
the hostile workplace cultures that develop as a result.279 The United
States has laws like Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA to hold employers accountable for the culture they create, perpetuate, or allow
to exist. Except, to those startups under fifteen employees,280 these
laws do not always apply—leaving in the balance state laws that
275

See Coren, supra note 101; THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; see also The
Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding, supra note 102.
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See Robehmed, supra note 110.
277
Id.
278
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Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 618 (2017).
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See Bhuiyan, supra note 81.
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may or may not protect employees depending on the state’s civil
rights statutes and equitable remedies that may or may not afford
recovery if a court exercises its discretion to disallow damages.
Antidiscrimination laws provide credibility to claims of harassment or discriminatory behavior that effectively induce an employee
to resign. Although the laws themselves, particularly federal, but
also state, are critically important, what is perhaps more important
in effect is the legal credibility afforded to victims. Moreover, when
protected by these laws, victims of discrimination have a way of being legally heard. In other words, robust antidiscrimination laws
give victims pathways to public recognition of the wrong and to a
recovery of damages that are otherwise far more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Legal recognition of discrimination, even if by
resignation and not termination,281 can provide a road to economic
justice for victims in a calculable reckoning for what they lost as a
result of workplace discrimination.
That recognition, however, is not always available to victims.
Even if the very same discriminatory behavior is perpetrated at different companies—one falling above and one below this fifteen-employee mark—only if the startup is at or above the minimum floor
of fifteen employees will such ubiquitous, guaranteed protections
against that discrimination apply to its employees.282 That is to say,
it is not the discriminatory behavior itself that catalyzes protection
for employees, but instead, the application of an antiquated and arbitrary numeric cutoff does so.283 This current legal reality is untenable with most startups and related jobs spreading across the nation,284 far from the prototypical and now-incomparable Silicon Valley model lawmakers have come to recognize as the status quo.285
Startups are as unique and variable286 as the problems their products
and services aim to solve. Lawmakers must properly understand
their unique practices in order to both help them innovate and protect those who foster that innovation. In short, “done” can never
281
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become “perfect” if we forget those most vulnerable in and necessary to getting it there.
Law, like software, is not immutable. The framework of federal
antidiscrimination law, state civil rights statutes, and discretionary
equitable remedy is not, at present, entirely adaptable for the current
“entrepreneurial renaissance.”287 Of several potential ways to remedy this gap, one of the most critical and broad-spectrum solutions
is the reimplementation of the OTA.
Although Congress did not inherently task the OTA with addressing the issue of economic inequity resulting from discriminatory cultural practices and equity compensation agreements, the
OTA explored science, technology, and business with the end goal
of creating well-informed policy on innovation.288 It was not limited
to well-publicized inquiries of tech CEOs hauled before Congress,289 and had a much broader spectrum of analysis to provide
lawmakers with the information they needed to make knowledgeable policy judgments.290 It follows that the OTA, while not directly
tasked with analyzing issues of labor law, had far more potential
than the current hearing-based model to provide lawmakers with a
broad-spectrum assessment of issues spanning the fields of science,
technology, and business. By focusing on enlightened policy, the
OTA could provide far more comprehensive detail on the issues actually affecting the startups engaging in and driving innovation—
importantly including those beyond the size, location, and reach of
Silicon Valley. The harassment described in this Note is just one of
the issues at the crux of startup culture and the breaking or redefining of legal norms relative to their practices. Reestablishing the
OTA’s advisory role in Congress could promote more sustainable
and better-informed policy objectives simply because it has the potential and the influence to shed light on issues that few, if anyone,
think to analyze.291 The OTA, or an advisory office like it, would
play a critical role in the iterative policymaking process necessary
to address this ever-changing startup nation.
287
288
289
290
291
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Further, and more specifically regarding federal antidiscrimination law, another potential solution is a legislative redefinition of the
terms under which Title VII, the ADEA, and other like federal laws
apply. As noted in Part III, unlike with Title VII, an employer’s violation of the ADEA is effectively seen as a violation of the FLSA
in terms of damages.292 For victims of discrimination, this discrepancy lies in an employee’s requirement to attempt to mitigate damages and court discretion over whether to award damages.293 Under
Title VII, employees seeking recourse must attempt to mitigate and,
subsequently, be awarded damages at the discretion of the court.294
Under the ADEA, neither apply, in that a finding of an ADEA violation outright warrants damages tantamount to a violation of the
FLSA.295 In terms of recovery for victims of discrimination, the
FLSA standard could prove even more useful beyond merely
providing more robust recovery standards under the ADEA.
Moreover, being a law eponymously involving fair labor standards, and therefore wages, the FLSA governs companies under commerce-based standards,296 as opposed to the employee number requirement standards for Title VII, the ADEA, and like federal antidiscrimination laws.297 Under FLSA standards, companies of more
than two employees that are engaged in at least $500,000 in sales
per annum are under the purview of the FLSA.298 Importantly, even
if the company itself does not meet these requirements, individuals
are extended the protection of the FLSA if they are involved in or
produce goods for interstate commerce.299
There is no escaping the reality that startups are unique among
businesses. They seek exponential growth and, in a sense, have an
almost hydraulic effect—taking minimal cash, time, and human capital to produce something that, whether by hype or function, can be

292
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orders of magnitude larger than the sum of its parts.300 The startup
model is not one that is conducive to laws that govern any and every
small business because a startup, even if small or young, can have a
massively outsized effect on its people, product, market, and environment. That is, in fact, somewhat the point. It follows that laws
that do not contemplate the hydraulic nature of startups are not wellsuited for their culture or practices. Put another way, Title VII, the
ADEA, and any like antidiscrimination law that has a minimum
floor of applicability predicated upon a set number of employees
may not be well-suited for companies, like startups, that, by their
very nature, work to get the most output out of the least possible
input in an effort to conserve already-scarce resources like human
capital.301
Were antidiscrimination protections under Title VII, the ADEA,
and others to be applied on an FLSA-type commerce scale, however,
that would likely be far more fitting to the hydraulic nature and exponential growth aims of startups. Given that a violation of the
ADEA is, in terms of damages, already tantamount to a violation of
the FLSA,302 there is an existing basis for likening, at least, certain
elements of discrimination (here, that of discrimination based on
age) to violations of wage and fair labor standards. Although undoubtedly not a perfect solution, as it would require situation-specific and drastic changes to the applicability of Title VII, the ADEA,
300

Facebook is an example: Mark Zuckerberg and a handful of employees had
made it to Palo Alto within a few months of its launch in February of 2004. Andrew Greiner, et al., Facebook at 15: How a College Experiment Changed the
World, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/business/facebook-history-timeline/index.html. Not long after, and under the guidance of the
founder of Napster, Sean Parker, Zuckerberg received a $500,000 investment
from Peter Thiel. Id. By December 2005, Facebook had upwards of six million
users. Anne Sraders, History of Facebook: Facts and What’s Happening in 2018,
THE
Street,
https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-of-facebook14740346 (last updated Feb. 18, 2020, 9:06 AM). By October 2012, Facebook
had exceeded a billion users. Id.
301
See supra Part II, Section A. This section notes that equity agreements are
used because cash is scarce, which leads to hiring those who will tie their fate to
the company’s by taking less cash in exchange for a deferred equity gamble. It
follows that both human capital and cash are scarce resources because the company cannot hire without limit.
302
Finnegan, supra note 147, at 578.
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and other federal civil rights laws, it is, at least, closer to approximating antidiscrimination laws suitable for the startup business
model.
The issue of this effective vacuum space between federal antidiscrimination laws, state civil rights laws, and equitable remedies
is, inherently, one that arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding
of how startups work. Issues that affect small or young startups may
never see the light of a Congressional hearing with a CEO of a billion-dollar technology company. And lawmakers, in failing to have
proper systems in place like the OTA to ensure that they are wellinformed on a broad spectrum of issues affecting science, technology, and business, are prone to myopic focus on the Silicon Valley
giants that produce such scandal and intrigue. This, combined with
a startup culture that, by its contracts, hiring practices, and social
morays, has proven to be vulnerable to abuses and erosions of employees’ rights, creates a situation in which an employee like Alex
may never recover.
Had Alex worked at the company for two more months, or one
full year, Alex would be eligible to receive twenty-five percent of
the stock options in the equity contract—the ability to purchase 500
shares of the equity that Alex specifically sought in the hiring process. Except, Alex worked there for ten months, or just over eighty
percent of the year. Given the one-year cliff in the equity contract,
it does not matter that Alex, by pro rata standards, worked to earn
approximately 400 of the 500 shares. By resigning ten months into
employment, Alex was due to receive nothing beyond a prorated
cash salary. Again, had Alex worked at the startup for two more
months, the ability to exercise the option to purchase 500 shares, or
twenty-five percent of the equity promised, would have vested.
However, for Alex, that would equate to two more months of harassment, stalking, and feeling unsafe at work every single day.
Alex’s choice was, therefore, to suffer that discrimination, or to lose
the equity compensation in its entirety, despite the ten months of
work and hostile work environment that compelled Alex’s resignation.
Extending the ubiquitous, nationwide protection of federal civil
rights laws like Title VII and the ADEA to circumstances previously
uncontemplated, such as this, would provide an avenue of recourse
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to the growing base of employees in the ever-expanding startup industry. Startup-driven innovation will not and should not stop. It is
a critical economic force that scholars, lawmakers, and other professionals alike must properly understand in order to create well-informed policy that will promote such innovation without conveying
untenable risk to the employees that are so critical in taking those
innovative products and services to market. The law must come to
acknowledge that the legal system has already been changed by
these unique businesses, and it must quickly adapt to prevent further
injustice. In short, the law must lead in striving for “perfect”—especially when most employers merely settle for “done.”

